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Parliament and the Courts: Strangers,
Foes or Friends?
Professor the Rt Hon the Lord Norton of Louth*
For most of the 20th century, the constitution of the United Kingdom was
seen as essentially settled. It experienced some adjustments, and at time
upheavals, in the relationship between the different components of the
state. These included the relationship between the state and the people,
the nations that formed the United Kingdom, and the two chambers of the
legislature.1 However, the framework of the constitution and the principles
underpinning it were viewed as fundamentally sound.
Towards the end of the century by contrast, change was substantial
and on a greater scale than before. As Robert Stevens observed in The
English Judges, the rate of change had tended to be glacial, but from 1970
onwards itwas on a scale unseen since the late 17th and early 18th Centuries.2
There had been major constitutional changes in the intervening years, but
these, he recorded, `were essentially independent acts rather than part of a
dramatic period of constitutional restructuring'.3 What we have witnessed
over the past half-century has been a constitution in flux,4 but one where
reforms have been disparate and discrete. Each has been justified on its
particular merits and not as part of an intellectually coherent approach to
constitutional change.5
The changes that have taken place have affected the relationship be-
tween the different state organs, not least between the executive, Parlia-
ment and the courts. The courts have sought, sometimes struggled, to adapt
to new roles deriving from the constitutional change, or at least have done
so following change for which judges were themselves responsible. I exam-
ine here the relationship between the courts and the legislature, how that
relationship has changed andhow the two stand in relation to the executive.
* Professor of Government, University of Hull.
1 The period saw agitation for female suffrage, Irish home rule and, less violently,
limitations on the power of the House of Lords. See Philip Norton, `Introduction: A
Century of Change' (2011) 30(1) Parliamentary History 1.
2 Robert Stevens, The English Judges (Hart Publishing 2002), xiii.
3 Ibid.
4 Philip Norton, The Constitution in Flux (Martin Robertson 1982).
5 Philip Norton, `The Constitution', in Anthony Seldon (ed), Blair's Britain 1997-2007 (Cam-
bridge University Press 2007) 104.
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1 Three Models
In order to make sense of the relationship between the courts and Parlia-
ment, I have advanced three models of judicial-legislative relationships.6
They can be summarised as determiningwhether the courts and Parliament
are essentially strangers, foes or friends.
The first is the respective autonomy model. Here, there is a relationship
between the executive and the legislature, the executive generating mea-
sures of public policy for debate and approval by the legislature; and be-
tween the executive and the judiciary, the courts determining challenges
brought against public authorities. However, there is no notable or sus-
tained relationship between the legislature and the courts. They are es-
sentially strangers to one another. They reflect the twin pillars of the con-
stitution as identified by Dicey: parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of
law. Under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament has `the
right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person
or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override
or set aside the legislation of Parliament'.7 Parliament determines the law.
The courts determine whether ministers and other public authorities have
acted within the law. If they have not, the courts can hold their actions ultra
vires and void. The courts may also so hold in cases where the action runs
contrary to the principle of natural justice. This common law power is at
the heart of the rule of law. Individual liberty, declared Dicey, was part of
the constitution because it was secured by the decisions of the courts, ex-
tended or confirmed by the Habeas Corpus Acts.8 Though Parliament could
enact measures that run counter to the principles of natural justice, there
has been recognition that judges should be left to protect the principle. Par-
liament and the courts have seen their roles as distinct, Dicey's twin pillars
being precisely that: each upright and not clashing with one another. The
6 Philip Norton, `A Democratic Dialogue? Parliament and Human Rights in the United
Kingdom' (2013) 21(2) Asia Pacific Law Review 141; Philip Norton, `Maintaining the
Balance? The relationship of parliaments to other branches of government', in Michal
Diamant et al, (eds), The Powers That Be (Wolf Legal Publishers 2013) 33.
7 Albert Dicey, An Introduction to the Law of the Constitution (7th ed, Macmillan 1908) 40. The
7th edition was the one in which, as Wade observed, Dicey finally settled the text. See
Emlyn Wade, `Introduction', in Albert Dicey, An Introduction to the Law of the Constitution
(10th ed, Macmillan 1959).
8 Dicey (7th ed) (n 7) 197.
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pillars underpin the stability of the constitutional edifice of theUnitedKing-
dom.
The second is the competing authoritymodel. Here there is a relationship
between the legislature and the courts, but it is an adversarial relationship.
They are seen as foes or at least stand in an uneasy relationship. The
legislature asserts its authority to speak for the people and in their name
determine public policy. The courts, for their part, may challenge outcomes
of the legislature where they offend fundamental constitutional provisions.
In theUnited States, Chief Justice JohnMarshall argued inMarbury vMadison
in 1803 that the role of the courts was to interpret the law and since the
constitution was the higher law, it was therefore the prerogative of the
courts to interpret the constitution.9 Though some jurists advanced a
respective autonomy thesis, arguing that each branch should interpret its
powers under the constitution,10 it was the power of judicial review read
into the constitution inMarbury that was to prevail. Other nations followed
the USA in crafting codified constitutions. Although it is not axiomatic
that the courts would serve as the interpreters of the provisions of a
constitution, in practice the responsibility has usually been vested in them.
The senior courts may thus find themselves in conflict with the executive
in holding certain actions unconstitutional. Here, there is engagement, but
it is negative.
The third is the democratic dialogue model. Here there is a relationship
between the legislature and the courts, but it is not an adversarial one, but
one of constructive engagement. The two exist as friends, or at least in a
relationship of comity. There is a case for both to be involved, especially in
systems where courts can only deal with cases and controversies brought
before them. They have no formal capacity to be proactive in the protection
of rights. The legislature has such a capacity and, in a system where
parliamentary sovereignty applies, is the body with ultimate responsibility
for approving measures stipulating the rights of the citizens. Courts are
thus protecting rights embodied in a document that, as Alison Young puts
it, has a democratic pedigree.11 The courts are best placed to interpret the
law, but the legislature is the body that can enact wide-rangingmeasures to
protect rights and indeed enact in law new rights whose moral validity has
9 Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803).
10 See Eakin v Raub 12 Sargeant & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson J) (dissenting).
11 Alison Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Hart Publishing 2009)
128.
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only recently been conceded. The value of dialogue between the different
branches is that, as Young argues, it underpins stability and it creates a
form of checks and balances between the courts and the legislature.12 It
facilitates achieving the balance between the liberal and democratic sides
of a liberal-democracy,13 with both courts and the parliament recognising
that each has a legitimate role and that each needs the other if rights are to
be protected effectively.
2 A History of Detachment
For most of the 20th century, and indeed prior to that, the model that
provided the best fit was the respective autonomy model. The doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty was confirmed by the Glorious Revolution of
1688-89, when parliamentarians and common lawyers combined against
the king. If the king was constrained by Parliament then so too were
his courts. Judicial obedience to the doctrine constitutes, in the words of
William Wade, `the ultimate political fact upon which the whole system of
legislation hangs'.14 The courts were subordinate to the will of Parliament
and therefore not a threat. They could be left undisturbed to fulfil their
distinct role. Judicial independence became an established tenet of the
British constitution. Parliament and the courts fulfilled discrete roles.
They were, in functional terms, strangers. The distance between them was
underpinned by art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688, ensuring that courts did not
pry into the proceedings of Parliament. Both Houses of Parliament kept
their distance from the work of the courts, adopting the practice of not
referring to matters that were sub judice.
3 The Challenges
Since the 1960s, the courts have increasingly faced a situation where
they have been called upon to render judgments that have been seen to
challenge the decisions of ministers, Parliament or devolved legislatures,
12 Ibid 172.
13 Philip Norton, `Maintaining the Balance? The Relationship of Parliaments to other
Branches of Government' (n 6).
14 WilliamWade, `The Basis of Legal Sovereignty' (1955) Cambridge Law Review xiii; cited in
Emlyn Wade (n 7) lvi.
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while at the same time becoming more detached from the other branches
of government. The challenges have been several. Only one could be
described as self-imposed. Until the mid-20th century, the courts were
reluctant to review the actions taken by ministers and administrative
authorities. In a series of cases in the 1960s however, the courts held certain
ministerial or administrative decisions to be ultra vires or contrary to the
principle of natural justice.15 The Padfield and Anisminic cases in particular,
were, according to Lord Scarman, `indications that in the commercial and
financial fields, where… the state has intruded with its administrative
agencies, the judges are ready to take the activist line'.16 The House of
Lords in 1966 also decided that it would no longer be bound by its own
precedents: `In future, the House decreed, it would no longer require an
act of Parliament to get rid of a precedent of the House which had outlived
its ``sell by date''.'17 The activism, or vigilance, of the courts showed no signs
of abating in succeeding decades.
3.1 Membership of the European Union
Since then, the courts have acquired an enhanced role as a consequence of
constitutional changes enacted by Parliament. The first, and constitution-
ally the most significant, was the European Communities Act 1972, provid-
ing the basis in domestic law for theUK'smembership of the European Com-
munities (now the European Union). The Act gave the force of law in the UK
not only to extant EC legislation, but also to future legislation.18 Questions
of law are to be decided by the European Court of Justice (renamed under
the Lisbon Treaty as the Court of Justice of the European Union) or in accor-
dance with decisions of that court.19 All UK courts are required to take judi-
cial notice of decisions by the European court.20 Cases that reach the highest
domestic court of appeal (then the House of Lords, now the Supreme Court)
are, unless the court determines that the law is already settled, referred to
15 Most notably Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40; Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission
[1969] 2 AC 147; Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910; Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food [1968] AC 997. See also Philip Norton, The Constitution in Flux (n 4), 135-9.
16 Leslie Scarman, English Law – The New Dimension (Stevens 1974) 49.
17 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment (Hart Publishing 2013) 265; Practice Statement [1966] 3 All
ER 77.
18 European Communities Act 1972 s 2(1).
19 European Communities Act 1972 s 3(1).
20 European Communities Act 1972 s 3(2).
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the European court for a definitive ruling.21 In the event of a conflict be-
tween the provisions of European law and those of an Act of Parliament, the
former are to prevail.22
The question of what the domestic courts would do in the event of
Parliament enacting a measure that expressly overrode a provision of
European law remains hypothetical.23 However, what happens where there
is an apparent inconsistency between UK and European law? The courts
are enjoined to construe UK law so as to render it consistent with European
law, but the implications of what could happen when such construction
could not be achieved were not realised until the 1990 Factortame and 1994
EOC cases.24 In the former, the ECJ held that the courts had the power of
injunction and could suspend the application of Acts of Parliament that
on their face appeared to breach European law until a final determination
was made. In the latter, the House of Lords held that the provisions of
the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 effectively excluding
part-time workers from the right to claim unfair dismissal or redundancy
payments were unlawful, being contrary to European law.25 `Britain',
declared The Times, `may now have for the first time in its history, a
constitutional court'.26
3.2 Human Rights Act 1998
However, in terms of bringing the courts more into the political realm, the
most significant development has been the enactment of the Human Rights
Act 1998, incorporating most of the provisions of the European Convention
of Human Rights into UK law. This was a novel challenge for the courts in
terms of interpretation. The nature of that interpretation created the po-
tential for conflict with how ministers interpreted particular measures. Al-
though the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was explicitly protected
21 See e.g. C-283/81 Srl CILFIT v Ministero Della Sanita [1982] ECR 3415.
22 R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary for State Transport (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603.
23 Cf R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 WLR
324.
24 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame [1990] 2 AC 85; ibid; Equal Opportunities
Commission v Secretary of State for Employment [1995] 1 AC 1.
25 See Paul Maxwell, `The House of Lords as a Constitutional Court – the Implications of Ex
Parte EOC', in Brice Dickson and Paul Carmichael (eds), The House of Lords: Its Parliamentary
and Judicial Roles (Hart Publishing 1999).
26 Ibid 197; citing The Times 5 March 1994.
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in the Act,27 the senior courts were empowered to issue declarations of in-
compatibility where they found that a public authority had acted contrary
to the provisions of a particular article (or articles) of the Convention.28 It
was then amatter for Parliament to change the law to bring it into line with
the court's interpretation.29
The implications of the Act were well expressed by Diana Woodhouse:
`it gives the courts an increased constitutional role, moving them from
the margins of the political process to the centre and increasing the
underlying tension between the executive and the judiciary'.30 The number
of cases resulting in declarations of incompatibility has not been numerous,
averaging fewer than two a year.31 Where the courts have found UK law
to be incompatible with the Convention, Parliament has in all but one case
amended the law to bring it into line with the court's judgment. However,
the exception highlights the potential for the courts to be mired in political
controversy. A declaration of incompatibility was made in Smith v Scott
in 2007,32 following the 2005 decision of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) in Hirst v UK (No 2),33 holding that the ban on prisoners being
able to vote in elections was incompatible with the Convention because of
its blanket nature. Successive governments avoided taking action on the
judgment. Jack Straw, for example, conceded that when he was Justice
Secretary, he had spent three years making sure there was no decision in
response to the judgment. He had, he admitted, `kicked the issue into touch,
first with one inconclusive public consultation, then with a second.'34 In
a debate in the House of Commons in 2011, MPs voted overwhelmingly,
by 234 votes to 22, in favour of maintaining the ban.35 In 2013, a Joint
Committee of both Houses of Parliament was appointed to consider the
issue. It recommended that prisoners serving sentences of up to 12 months
should be permitted to vote.36 The report was published at the beginning of
27 Human Rights Act 1998 s 4(2).
28 Human Rights Act 1998 s 4(1).
29 See Human Rights Act 1998 s 8.
30 Diana Woodhouse, `Politicians and the Judges: A conflict of Interest?' (1996) 55(2)
Parliamentary Affairs (1996) 440.
31 Philip Norton, Parliament in British Politics (2nd ed, Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 186.
32 Smith v Scott 2007 SC 345.
33 Hirst v UK (No 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41.
34 Jack Straw, Last Man Standing (Macmillan 2012) 538.
35 HC Deb 10 February 2011, vol 523, col 584.
36 Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill, Draft Voting Eligibility
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2014, but neither the Coalition Government nor its successor moved to act
on it.
The prisoner voting ban is the only case of a failure to act on a
declaration of incompatibility, but there are cases where Parliament has
acted that nonetheless highlights the tension that may derive from a
declaration of incompatibility. In 2004, in the Belmarsh case, the House of
Lords held that powers in Pt 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001 were disproportionate and discriminatory in applying only to foreign
nationals.37 Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said the Law Lords were `simply
wrong' and that it was for Parliament and not the courts to determine how
Britain could be defended from terrorism.38 The government nonetheless
amended the law, but the resulting legislation – the Prevention of Terrorism
Act 2005 – also fell foul of the courts.39 When Mr Justice Sullivan held
that a control order imposed on a particular individual breached art 6,
and other orders on a number of men breached art 5 ECHR, he was
accused by the Home Secretary's counsel of a string of legal errors and
misunderstandings.40 TheChairmanof theHouse of CommonsHomeAffairs
Committee, John Denham, spoke of a constitutional crisis: `This is not a
battle between government and the judiciary', he said, `This is between the
elected Parliament and the judiciary'.41 Former Home Secretary Charles
Clarke criticised judges for failing to meet him when he was in office
in order to discuss human rights legislation in the light of the terrorist
threat, characterising it as one of his most depressing experiences as Home
Secretary.42 Although the courts had sought to engagewith the executive,43
this was not necessarily how ministers saw it. Tensions became such that
(Prisoners) Bill: Report (2013-14, HL 103; HC 924).
37 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2004] 2 AC 68.
38 Philip Norton, `The Constitution: Selective Incrementalism Continues', in Michael Rush
and Philip Giddings (eds), The Palgrave Review of British Politics 2005 (Palgrave Macmillan
2006) 16-17.
39 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 AC 385; Secretary of
State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 AC 440.
40 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2006] EWHC 1000 (Admin), [2006] HRLR 29.
41 Matthew Tempest, `Judges spark ``constitutional crisis''' The Guardian (London, 29 June
2006) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/jun/29/ukcrime.humanrights> accessed
3 October 2015.
42 Patrick Wintour and Tania Branigan, `Clarke blames judges for confusion on
rights' The Guardian (London, 4 July 2006) < http://www.theguardian.com/poli-
tics/2006/jul/04/uk.humanrights> accessed 3 October 2015.
43 See Paterson (n 17) 296-7.
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the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, felt the need to
emphasise that the judgewas doinghis job of applying the law and enforcing
the rule of law.44 The Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, also acted to warn
ministers not to interfere in judicial cases.45
Relations between government and the judiciary were seen as being at
a particularly low point at the end of the Blair premiership. Despite having
trained as a barrister, Tony Blair was criticised for not understanding the
role of the courts.46 Tension, however, continued beyond his occupancy of
Downing Street as a consequence of media and politicians' criticisms of the
courts for their ECHR jurisprudence. The courts were criticised for adhering
too closely to the `mirror principle', faithfully following the interpretation
of the Strasbourg court.47 Although there has been something of a shift
in the stance of the senior courts – `it is clear that the UK courts now
regard themselves as being at best loosely bound by the mirror principle'48
– media criticism of some Strasbourg judgments has fuelled demands for a
British Bill of Rights.49 Following the formation of a Coalition Government
in 2010, the two coalition partners reached a compromise on the creation
of a commission to consider a British Bill of Rights: In response to a
parliamentary question about rulings of the European Court of Human
Rights on prisoner voting and a Supreme Court ruling giving offenders the
possibility of coming off the sex offenders' register, the Prime Minister
stated that `a commission will be established imminently to look at a British
Bill of Rights because it is about time we ensured that decisions are made in
this Parliament rather than in the courts'.50
The Commission that was formed recommended in favour of such a Bill
of Rights, believing that it would help get away from the `highly polarised
44 Select Committee on the Constitution, Meeting with the Lord Chief Justice: Report with
Evidence (2005-06, HL 213) Q59.
45 BBC News, `Judges ``in touch with reality''' BBC News Online (18 July 2006)
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5192408.stm> accessed 3 October 2015.
46 Philip Norton, `Tony Blair and the Office of Prime Minister', in Matt Beech and Simon Lee
(eds), Ten Years of New Labour (Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 96-7.
47 See R v Special Adjudicator ex p Ullah [2004] UKHL 26, [2004] 2 AC 323.
48 ColmO'Cinneide, `Human Rights and the Constitution', in Jeffrey Jowell, Dawn. Oliver and
Colm O'Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (Oxford University Press 2015) 89.
49 See Alexander Horne and Lucinda Maer, `From the Human Rights Act to a Bill of Rights?'
in Alexander Horne, Gavin Drewry and Dawn Oliver (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart
Publishing 2013) 251-79.
50 Martin Loughlin and Cal Viney, `The Coalition and the Constitution', in Anthony Seldon
and Mike Finn (eds), The Coalition Effect 2010-2015 (Cambridge University Press 2015) 78.
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debate' surrounding the Human Rights Act.51 Though no action was taken
by the Government on the report, the Conservative Party subsequently
published a policy document proposing that the HRA be replaced by a
measure that in effect rendered judgments of the Strasbourg court as
advisory. The proposal to replace the HRAwith a British Bill of Rights found
its way into the Conservative Partymanifesto at the 2015 general election.52
The proposal for a British Bill of Rights highlighted the tension inherent
in the competing authority model. There is little to suggest that the tension
would be abated by the enactment of a British Bill of Rights. Tension may
be exacerbated rather than abated given that Convention rights form part
of the general principles of European Union law and would potentially
have to be applied by the UK courts where EU law is engaged.53 Devolved
administrations are also required by the devolution legislation to comply
with Convention rights.54 Any revision of the constitutional settlement
to de-apply Convention rights has the potential to disrupt the devolution
settlement.55 In September 2015, Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon
said that while the Human Rights Act 1998 was reserved legislation, human
rights was a devolved issue and any attempt to amend the Act would likely
require the consent of the Scottish Parliament. `It is inconceivable in my
opinion… that such consent would be granted.'56
3.3 Devolution
Devolution has also created significant challenges for the courts. In part,
this is a consequence of Wales not having its own judicial system. As the
Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, has observed, `Although the
effect of the grant of full law making powers in the devolved fields in 2011
has taken some time to work its way through, the unitary court system of
51 Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? – The Choice Before Us (December 2012),
vol 1, 29.
52 The Conservative Party, Strong Leadership, A Clear Economic Plan, A Brighter, More Secure
Future (The Conservative Party 2015) 60.
53 See C-410/98 Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859.
54 See Scotland Act 1998 s 29(2)(d); Government of Wales Act 2006 s 94(6)(c); Northern
Ireland Act 1998 s 6(2)(c).
55 See O'Cinneide (n 48) 100.
56 BBC News, `Sturgeon warns against plans to scrap Human Rights Act' BBC News Online (23
September 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-34331682>
accessed 3 October 2015.
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England and Wales is having to adapt to administering laws passed by two
different legislative bodies, one of which legislates bilingually.'57
There is a more fundamental challenge in that constitutional change
has the potential to propel the courts into political controversy. The
courts are in effect constitutional courts for Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland. (As was previously the case with Northern Ireland when it had
its own legislature under the Government of Ireland Act 1920.) The
governments of the different parts of the UK can only act within the terms
of the Acts creating the devolved systems of government. How the senior
courts interpret that legislation could conflict with the interpretation of
the devolved administration. The potential is particularly apparent in
the context of Scotland. The demands of the Scottish National Party
government for more powers may lead to conflict with the courts as
well as the UK government. The Scotland Bill introduced after the 2015
general election has significant constitutional provisions, some of which
are essentially declaratory and are not obviously amenable to judicial
resolution.58
The potential for conflict is also facilitated by the fact that, as we have
noted, the devolved authorities are bound by the devolution legislation
to comply with the provisions of the ECHR. The relevance here is that
they lack the capacity of the UK Parliament to decline to comply with the
interpretation of the courts. There is thus the potential for Scottish (or
Welsh or Northern Irish) politicians to attack the courts for judgments that
conflict with decisions they have taken as representatives of the people, but
with which they are required to comply. Most devolution cases that come
before the Supreme Court (jurisdiction having beenmoved from the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council) are brought on grounds of conflict with
Convention rights, and in some cases it has overridden interpretationsmade
by the Scottish courts.59 As Lady Hale has recorded, `Hallowed practices
of the Scottish criminal justice system have proved irreconcilable with the
57 Lord Thomas, Speech to the Commonwealth Magistrates' and Judges' Association (15
September 2015).
58 They include a clause that simply states the Sewel convention (that the UK Parliament
will not normally legislate on matters that are devolved without the consent of the
Scottish Parliament). It fails to stipulate the conditions as to when it is and when it is not
permissible for the UK Parliament to legislate in the absence of the Scottish Parliament
passing a legislative consent motion.
59 See John McEldowney, `The Impact of Devolution on the UK Parliament', in Alexander
Horne, Gavin Drewry and Dawn Oliver (n 49), 202-4.
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European Convention. This has, to say the least, proved controversial in
Scotland.'60
Furthermore, law officers can refer Bills after they have been passed by
a devolved legislature, but before they have received Royal Assent, to the
Supreme Court to determine if they are within the scope of the legislature's
powers.61 There have been three references to date in respect of measures
passed by the National Assembly for Wales, but as yet no references in
respect of Bills passed by the Scottish Parliament.62 There may be political
reasons for this, given that, as Lady Hale, observed, such a reference by the
UK Government may be seen by the Scottish government and Parliament as
a hostile act.63
4 The Creation of the Supreme Court
The potential for conflict between the courts and Parliament thus increased
notably in the latter half of the 20th century. The potential was arguably
ameliorated by the extent to which parliamentarians understood and
appreciated the role of the judiciary. The proximity of parliamentarians and
senior judges (categories that, as we shall see, were not mutually exclusive)
enabled each to appreciate the distinct role of the other. In short, the
closeness of the two in terms of their daily activities paradoxically helped
to protect the autonomy of each in fulfilling their particular roles. It was
not the cause of, but it helped maintain, the relationship embodied in the
respective autonomy model.
That closeness, though, came under challenge in the latter decades of
the century and was largely dissipated by the enactment of the Constitu-
tional ReformAct 2005 (the 2005Act) creating a SupremeCourt of theUnited
Kingdom and replacing the Lord Chancellor with the Lord Chief Justice as
60 Lady Hale, The Supreme Court in the United Kingdom Constitution (Somerville College
Oxford 5 February 2015), 8, citing in particular the decisions in Cadder vHMAdvocate [2010]
UKSC 43, [2010] 1 WLR 2601; Fraser v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 24, 2011 SLT 515.
61 Scotland Act 1998 s 33; Government of Wales Act 1998 s 99; Northern Ireland Act 1998;
Northern Ireland Act 1998 s11.
62 Local Government Byelaws (Wales) Bill 2012 - Reference by the Attorney General for England and
Wales [2012] UKSC 53, [2013] 1 AC 792; Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill – Reference by the
Attorney General for England and Wales [2014] UKSC 43; Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos
Diseases (Wales) Bill – Reference by the Counsel General for Wales [2015] UKSC 3.
63 Lady Hale (n 60) 10.
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head of the judiciary. The Act was the culmination of a process of detach-
ment of the courts from Parliament. As the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas
of Cwmgiedd, has observed, there were various reasons for this. There is
now, in contrast with earlier in the last century, only one judge who has
served as an MP or minister. There are also few MPs who have practised
as lawyers for a significant period of time before becoming MPs,64 and few
who continue in practice after election. The Lord Chancellor's Department,
which had been staffed almost exclusively by senior lawyers, evolved into
a Ministry of Justice which has senior officials who mostly have no experi-
ence of courts and are not lawyers. There is also a notable turnover within
the ranks of the civil service, whereasmany lawyers and judges perform the
same sort of work for most or all of their professional life: `this provides for
a very different outlook and levels of detailed knowledge'.65
The point to note about this analysis is that it relates to MPs and the
executive (ministers and civil servants). There is no mention of the House
of Lords. Until the 2005 Act, the head of the judiciary and members of the
most senior court were members of the House of Lords. Law Lords were
the first examples of life peers, appointed under the Appellate Jurisdiction
Act 1876 to fulfil the judicial function of the House, along with the Lord
Chancellor, former Lord Chancellors and peers who have held high judicial
office. (Formally, other peers may participate in judicial hearings, but the
last time a peer, albeit a barrister of long standing, attempted this – in 1883
– he was ignored.)66 The Law Lords had offices in the Palace of Westminster
abutting offices of other peers. It was also a convention that a Law Lord
chaired the European Union Committee sub-committee (Sub-Committee
E) dealing with law and institutions. Judicial hearings were heard in a
committee room (Committee Room 1 and, as necessary, Committee Room
2) with judgments delivered in the chamber, albeit in a designated judicial
sitting. (The Law Lords occupied the two front benches, with the senior
Law Lord occupying the Woolsack.) Other peers could, and occasionally
64 Though there was a slight reversal of the trend in the 2015 election, when the proportion
of lawyers among newly-elected MPs was slightly higher than in the preceding Parlia-
ments.
65 Lord Thomas, `The Judiciary, the Executive and Parliament: Relationships and the Rule of
Law' (Address to the Institute for Government 1 December 2014) 2.
66 Owen Hood Phillips, Constitutional and Administrative Law (5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 1973)
136-7. The convention that lay peers do not participate was set in O'Connell v The Queen
(1844) 11 Cl & F 155.
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did, sit in on the chamber sittings. The Law Lords, as members of the
House, were eligible to speak in debates. They did not usually speak on
legislation, given that they may have to sit judicially to interpret it at a
later date, but they could speak on other issues, such as the administration
of the court system. Though their participation in the chamber declined
when Lord Bingham became senior Law Lord—he took the view that Law
Lords should not normally participate67—some nonetheless did speak on
occasion. The Law Lord chairing Sub-Committee E, for example, would
speak to introduce a report emanating from the sub-committee. (The
last Law Lord to speak in parliamentary proceedings was Lord Mance, in
introducing a sub-committee report.) They were also formally entitled to
vote and on very rare occasions did so: two Law Lords (Lord Hoffman and
Lord Scott of Foscote) caused some controversy by publicly opposing the
ban on fox hunting, an opposition that extended to voting against the ban.
The House also contained other `judicial peers'. Their number by
convention included the Lord Chief Justice, but variously included the
Master of the Rolls and the Lord President in Scotland. Some peers have
served on the Court of Session. Lord Lowry, Lord Chief Justice of Northern
Ireland, was elevated to the peerage in 1979 while still in post.
The detachment of the judiciary from the House of Commons and the
executive arguably enhanced the link with the House of Lords. The House
of Lords remained as a buffer between the judiciary and the executive,
an executive that was such because it enjoyed a majority in the House of
Commons. Though there was a Conservative preponderance in the House
of Lords until passage of the House of Lords Act 1999, no government could
take the House for granted. Law Lords may not normally speak in debates,
but other peers with legal experience, including retired Law Lords, could
and did. Notable figures to take part in the deliberations of the House
in the late 20th century included Lords Ackner,68 Simon of Glaisdale69 and
67 Lord Bingham stated in 2000 that the Law Lords had agreed that it would not be
appropriate for them to engage in matters where there was a strong element of public
controversy, a statement that `merely validated a convention which had already grown
up.' Michael Beloff, `The End of the Twentieth Century: The House of Lords 1982-2000',
in Louis Blom-Cooper, Brice Dickson and Gavin Drewry (eds), The Judicial House of Lords
1876-2009 (Oxford University Press 2009) 253.
68 A Law Lord from 1986 to 1992.
69 A former Solicitor General who left Parliament to become a judge, he served as President
of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division.
66 UK Supreme Court Yearbook · 2014–2015
Wilberforce.70
The value of this relationship was that it had the potential to reduce
or limit conflict between Parliament and the courts. As I wrote in 2005:
`The House of Lords in its legislative capacity can act as something of a
protector of the House in its judicial capacity. The Law Lords, for their part,
are better able to understand the role of the legislature. The interaction
does not jeopardise the independence or the integrity of the judges but
enhances their understanding'.71 The fundamental advantage, as Louis
Blom-Cooper andGavinDrewry observed, was that itwas a two-way channel
of communication.72
The 2005 Act served to sever the link with the House of Lords, thus
finalising the detachment of judiciary and Parliament. It not only created
the Supreme Court and removed the Law Lords from the House, but also
disbarred other judicial peers (such as the Lord Chief Justice) until such
time as they completed their tenure of office. The danger posed by the
change was to isolate the Supreme Court from the protective environment
of Westminster. Recognising the danger of isolation was not confined to
observers of the court. Some Law Lords were very much aware of the
implications posedbymoving across Parliament Square. Although themove
was supported by the senior law lord, Lord Bingham, and by three other
Law Lords, six opposed it, arguing that the creation of a Supreme Court
was unnecessary and potentially harmful.73 The Supreme Court may be a
short walk from the Palace of Westminster, but in terms of its visibility to
parliamentarians it may as well be in some far-flung city.
The implications of the move need to be seen in the context of relations
between the executive and judiciary. PrimeMinister TonyBlair's decision to
create a Supreme Court was announced in 2003, without prior consultation
with the judiciary, orwith the LordChancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg. Thiswas
70 The only judge in recent times to be appointed as a Law Lord straight from the High Court
bench, he was a Law Lord from 1964 to 1982.
71 Philip Norton, `Parliament and the Courts', in Nicholas Baldwin (ed), Parliament in the 21st
Century (Politico's 2005) 322.
72 Louis Blom-Cooper and Gavin Drewry, Final Appeal (Oxford University Press 1972) 209,
cited in GrahamGee et al, The Politics of Judicial Independence in theUK's Changing Constitution
(Cambridge University Press, 2015) 93.
73 Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, The Law Lords' Response to the Government's Consultation Paper
on Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom (House of Lords, 27 Octo-
ber 2003) <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/judicial-office/judicialscr071103.pdf>
accessed on 3 October 2015, 1.
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the year in which the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, had attacked a
decision of the High Court in an asylum case – `we don't accept what Justice
Collins has said' – and claimed that the courts `routinely' rewrote the effects
of a law that Parliament had passed.74 Judges, he said, should live in the `real
world'. He penned an article for The News of the World headed `It's Time for
Judges to Learn their Place'.75 He was following in the footsteps of some his
predecessors in criticising the decisions of the courts.
Various senior lawyers in the Lords responded to the criticism. One
former Law Lord, Lord Ackner, observed `While accepting that in any
democracy there will always be a measure of tension between the judiciary
and the executive, the present position has become intolerable.'76 Arguably,
the need for the protection afforded by the chamber in which he was
speaking was at its greatest in modern history, but the links that enhanced
the relationship between the judicial and legislativewings of theHousewere
in the process of being broken. By leaving the confines of Westminster, the
highest court was in danger of being isolated and vulnerable to attack by an
executive keen to get its way, especially on legislationwhere it saw the need
to protect the public from harm as trumping the protection of individual
rights.
5 The Changing Relationship
The challenge facing the courts after the creation of the Supreme Court
may be seen in terms of the models of the relationship between Parliament
and the courts. The respective autonomy that characterised relations until
the late part of the 20th century was in danger of being superseded by one
of competing authority. A competing authority model appeared at times
to characterise the relationship between the executive and the courts, but
could it be avoided in the relationship between courts and Parliament? The
ideal was one of comity, of democratic dialogue, for the reasons discussed
in opening, but to what extent has experience matched the model?
The need for a relationship between Parliament and the courts has
been both understood and facilitated by judges and by Parliament. The
74 Philip Norton, `Governing Alone' (2003) 56(4) Parliamentary Affairs 553. See Stevens (n 2)
129-36.
75 Cited in Gee et al (n 72) 49.
76 HL Deb 21 May 2003, vol 648, col 891.
68 UK Supreme Court Yearbook · 2014–2015
recognition may be seen as grounded in what had gone before. As Gee et
al recorded, `Perhaps because of the Law Lords' traditional involvement in
the House of Lords, the senior judiciary has been receptive to overtures
and willing to engage with Parliament.'77 The uncertain relationship with
the executive provided an impetus for maintaining a relationship with
Parliament and Parliament had both the institutional framework and to
some degree the political will to facilitate that relationship, both features
that were relatively recent.
The established relationship was apparent and had effect when the
Constitutional Reform Bill reached the House of Lords in 2004. The House
took the unusual step of referring the Bill to a select committee for further
consideration. The committee included senior members of the House,
among them QCs such as former Foreign Secretary Lord Howe of Aberavon;
retired Law Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick; and Lords Bledisloe, Goodhart,
and Kingsland. It reported in July 2014,78 making 485 recommendations:
no fewer than 462 amendments were made as a result of the committee's
work.79 The changes helped to protect judicial independence.80 The Lord
Chancellor under his oath is sworn to `respect the rule of law'.81
The relationship that I have sketched above thus provided the basis
for ensuring that judicial independence continued beyond the period when
it was protected by convention and the understandings that underpinned
much of the British constitution. As a consequence of the Act, the Lord
Chancellor need no longer be a peer or a lawyer,82 but s/he retains an
important role in protecting the independence of the judiciary and a unique
role in respect of the rule of law.83
Recognition of the need for maintaining a relationship of comity has
been well expressed by both peers and judges. The Select Committee on
the Constitutional Reform Bill reported that `it is desirable for a committee
of Parliament to act as a bridge between Parliament and the judiciary,
77 Gee et al (n 72) 124.
78 Constitutional Reform Bill Committee, Constitutional Reform Bill – First Report (2003-04, HL
Paper 125-I).
79 See Gee et al (n 72) 117.
80 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 s 3(1): `The Lord Chancellor, other Ministers of the
Crown and all with responsibility for matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to
the administration of justice must uphold the continued independence of the judiciary.'
81 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 s 17.
82 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 s 2.
83 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 s 3.
Parliament and the Courts: Strangers, Foes or Friends? 69
particularly in the event of the senior judges being excluded from the
House'.84 The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, speaking at the
end of 2014 at the Institute for Government, declared: `the independence of
the judiciary, far fromprecluding relationshipswith the other two branches
of the state, requires engagement with both'.85 As he went on to note in
a later speech, this necessitated a more proactive stance in promoting an
understanding of the importance of justice.86
Following the changes announced in 2003, resulting in the 2005 Act,
judges were keen to develop links to supersede that provided by the
presence of the Law Lords as well as more generally to raise the profile
of their activities. The initial concern was the absence of a means of
communicating formally with Parliament. Neither the Law Lords nor the
Lord Chief Justice now had the platform provided by the House of Lords to
put their concerns on the record. Before the 2005 Act even made it to the
statute book, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, moved quickly to establish
some link with Parliament, primarily through the Constitution Committee
of the House of Lords.87 It was agreed that should the Lord Chief Justice
wish to raise an issue with the Committee, he would be able to do so. This
becamemore formalised, both in statute and in practice through the greater
specialisation of both Houses through committees.
The statutory provision came in the 2005Act. S 7 confers a responsibility
on the Lord Chief Justice to represent the views of the judiciary of England
and Wales to Parliament. The Lord Chief Justice is also empowered, under
s 5, to lay written representations before Parliament. Although the LCJ
has not pursued a recommendation of the Constitution Committee to lay a
report annually,88 the power has nonetheless variously been utilised. Both
Houses also provide a means for a democratic dialogue through the use of
committees. The creation of a series of select committees by the House of
Commons in 1979 was arguably the most important parliamentary reform
for half-a-century. They provided for a more specialised House and for
one that no longer accorded a virtual monopoly to the executive as the
84 Constitutional Reform Bill Committee (n 78) [420].
85 Lord Thomas (n 65) 3.
86 Lord Thomas (n 57).
87 At the time of the initial contact, made through the Lord Chancellor, I was Chairman of
the Committee.
88 Select Committee on the Constitution, Relations Between the Executive, the Judiciary and
Parliament: Follow-up Report, (Session 2007-08, HL 177) [21]-[23].
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supplier of information. They also provided an agenda setting capacity,
given that the topics for inquiry were chosen by the committees and not
the Government.
This institutional change occurred at a time, and, indeed, may be
seen as a consequence, of as greater willingness on the part of MPs to
act independently of their parties. Party whips could not take members'
support for granted in the way that had been possible before.89 In the
House of Lords, the principal change was the passage of the House of Lords
Act 1999, removing more than 500 hereditary peers from membership.
The consequence was that no one party enjoyed a majority in the House.
Successive Governments thus had to engage with the House. Whereas
the House of Commons indulged in the politics of assertion, the House
of Lords engaged in the politics of justification.90 Both Houses were in a
position more than before where members may be willing to stand up to
government, including on issues of civil liberties. The Blair Government
suffered its first defeat when in 2005 it sought to extend the period for
pre-charge detention to 90 days.91 Attempts to limit jury trials also
floundered in the House of Lords,92 as did an attempt to restrict pre-charge
detention to 42 days.93 Of 488 Government defeats in the Lords between
1999 and 2012, 170 related to justice and the courts.94
Parliament was thus in a position, institutionally and politically, to
adapt to protect the role of the judiciary and the rule of law following
the departure of the Law Lords from the Palace of Westminster. That
adaptation took place not least through two new committees. Both came
into being in 2001. The Constitution Committee of the House of Lords was
created following a recommendation of the Royal Commission on Reform
of the House of Lords (the Wakeham Commission) which felt the House
89 See Parliament in British Politics (n 31) 27-30.
90 Philip Norton, `The Legislative Process in the House of Lords', in Alexander Horne and
Andrew Le Seuer (eds), Legislation and Accountability (Hart Publishing, 2016, forthcoming).
91 The provision was rejected by 322 votes to 291. See Richard Kelly, Oonagh Gay, and Philip
Cowley, `Parliament: The House of Commons – Turbulence Ahead?' in Michael Rush and
Philip Giddings (n 38) 106-7.
92 In 2000, the Government abandoned its Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) Bill after the
House voted by 222 votes to 126 for an amendment to restore the right of the accused
to choose jury trial.
93 The House voted in 2008 by 309 votes to 118 against extending the 28-day limit to 42 days.
94 Gee et al (n 72) 116.
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should act as a constitutional safeguard.95 The Joint Committee on Human
Rights (JCHR) was brought into being in response to the implementation of
the Human Rights Act 1998.96 They were complemented by a committee
covering the Lord Chancellor's Department, formed in 2003 and later
superseded by the Judiciary Select Committee.
The committees provided a specialised means of contact with the
judiciary, hearing from judges in the course of various inquiries, and
proving allies with the judiciary in ensuring, or seeking to ensure, that both
Houses understood the role of the courts. Members of the committees,
especially the Constitution Committee and the Joint Committee, variously
had backgrounds in the law or the constitution (there were normally
one or more QCs on each and, in respect of the Constitution Committee,
variously former holders of judicial office) and so the exchangeswith judges
appearing the committees were informed. Among those serving on the
Constitution Committee have beenmembers who have served as Lord Chief
Justice (Lord Woolf, Lord Judge), Attorney General (Lord Goldsmith) and
Lord Chancellor (Lord Irvine of Lairg). The membership has also included
leading lawyers such as LordPannick andLord Lester ofHerneHill, the latter
regularly serving also on the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
The Constitution Committee through its inquiries, including its reports
on legislation of constitutional significance, generated various constitu-
tional standards to underpin legislation,97 providing the potential basis for
a code of legislative standards, something that would have to come from
Parliament, given that government has rejected the need for such a code.98
Fourteen of the standards relate to the judiciary, mostly designed to pro-
tect the independence of the judiciary.99 It has engaged in dialogue with
ministers and judges and become an essential arena for dialogue between
95 Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future (Cm 4534
2000).
96 See Paul Evans, `The Human Rights Act and Westminster's Legislative Process', in Alex
Brazier (ed), Parliament, Politics and LawMaking (London: The Hansard Society 2004) 84-93.
97 Jack Simpson Caird, Robert Hazell and DawnOliver, The Constitutional Standards of theHouse
of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (2nd ed, The Constitution Unit 2015).
98 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Ensuring standards in the quality of legisla-
tion: Government response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2013-14 (Session 2013-14,
HC 611) [12].
99 Simpson Caird, Hazell and Oliver (n 97) 9-10. There are others dealing with individual
rights, access to justice, due process and procedural fairness.
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the House of Lords and the judiciary.100 As LeSueur and Simpson Caird
have recorded, the Committee fulfils four main goals. It is a facilitator, en-
abling judges to air concerns about the administration of justice. It serves
to hold ministers to account for responsibilities relating to judicial matters.
It serves, within boundaries, to call senior judges to account for matters re-
lating to the judiciary. And, last but not least, it has oversight of the consti-
tutional architecture built since 2005.101
It has engaged not only as a recipient of evidence about the work of
the judiciary, but has also served to influence the judiciary. It encouraged
the Lord Chief Justice to change his communications strategy, resulting in a
more proactive Judicial Communications Office and the giving of an annual
press conference.102 Its report on judicial diversity was designed to assist in
widening access to judicial appointments by women andmembers of ethnic
minorities.
The committees have proved to be allies with the courts in relation
to the executive and on occasion to Parliament as a whole. As Gee et al
recorded, the JCHR has helped foster a political culture respectful of the
courts and the judges who work in them.103 `Behind the scenes, the JCHR
has also encouraged ministers to use temperate language when criticising
judicial decisions'104 and prompted a more co-ordinated approach in gov-
ernment to dealingwith human rights issues.105 Part of the culture has been
a greater awareness of, certainly more frequent references to, the Commit-
tee and to human rights. Hunt, Hooper and Yowell found that in the 2001-05
Parliament, there were 23 substantive references to the committee by MPs
and peers. In the following Parliament, there were 1,006 references.106 The
same period also saw a significant increase in references to human rights:
23,328 mentions, of which over 17,000 occurred in the 2005-10 Parliament.
Of the references, 60 per cent were in the context of legislative scrutiny.107
Notably, and not surprisingly in the light of our discussion, two-thirds of all
100Andrew Le Sueur and Jack Simpson Caird, `The House of Lords Select Committee on the
Constitution', in Alexander Horne, Gavin Drewry and Dawn Oliver (n 49) 281, 304-6.
101 Le Sueur and Simpson Caird (n 90) 305-06.
102Gee et al (n 72) 108.
103 Ibid, 116; see also Philip Norton, A Democratic Dialogue (n 6).
104 Ibid.
105 Parliament in British Politics (n 31) 190.
106Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell, Parliament and Human Rights: Redressing the
Democratic Deficit (Arts and Humanities Research Council 2012) 19.
107 Ibid 30-1.
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references to the JCHR were made in the House of Lords.
The contact between committees and judges is notable for its quantity
as well as its quality. Gee et al recorded 148 records of oral evidence given
by 72 salaried UK judges before select committees.108 There was a notable
concentration on occasion, not least when the Constitution Committee
undertook an inquiry into judicial appointments. The hearings on occasion
comprised two or more judges appearing to give evidence, notable on
occasion for the witnesses not always agreeing with one another. The
sessions provided a means of discourse between the judges themselves as
well as between the judges and the committee. Hearings also reflected the
nature of the Lords as existed previously, themembership of the committee
including Lord Irvine of Lairg, who as Lord Chancellor had been responsible
for appointing some of the judges appearing before the committee.
The discourse extends to court judgments. Despite the provision of
art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688, it has not been deemed constitutionally
improper for courts to refer to reports of the JCHR. In the period to March
2012, there were 72 cases in UK or European courts in which reference was
made to the JCHR or a JCHR report.109 On occasion, they were utilised as
potentially persuasive in reaching a decision. `In total there were fourteen
instances (nineteen per cent of cases [in which reports were cited]) where
the majority of the court agreed with the reasoning of the JCHR. There
was one instance (one per cent of cases) where the views of the JCHR were
regarded as persuasive by a dissenting judge.'110
The dialogue undertaken by committees extending beyond engaging
with judges and ministers in the UK was also apparent in the inquiry un-
dertaken by the Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners)
Bill. It took evidence not only from the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney
General (who took somewhat different approaches), but also from Thorb-
jørn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe. It was in effect
acting as an arena for dialogue between Parliament and the Council of Eu-
rope, the Secretary General being keen to stress reforms being undertaken
in the ECHR itself. The nature of informed discourse was enhanced by the
fact that themembers of the Joint Committee included the former President
of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers.
108Gee et al (n 72) 101.
109Hunt, Cooper and Yowell (n 106) 45.
110 Ibid 52.
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6 Conclusion
The relationship of Parliament and the courts has seen some movement
from that of respective autonomy to one of democratic dialogue. This is
the view of the President of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger. When
presented with the three models, when giving evidence to the House of
Lords Constitution Committee, he took the view:
It has tended to be the first [respective autonomy], but we have
got more of the third [democratic dialogue], and that is a good
thing provided we respect each other's boundaries. I would
hope that we can avoid the second [competing authority]. So
far we have, and I hope that will continue.111
Although some judges have occasionally strayed into the territory of
arguing that the courts may not uphold legislation that violates basic tenets
of the constitution – most notably Lord Steyn in his obiter dictum in the
Jackson case in 2006112 – they remain siren voices. `Most Justices might
well consider legislation which seeks to alter fundamental or constitutional
rights to be lacking in legitimacy, and as such subject it to extremely close
scrutiny, but in the end accept that that is the law.'113 The status of judicial
authority was reiterated by Lady Hale in evidence to the House of Lords
Constitution Committee, when both she and the President of the Court,
Lord Neuberger, confirmed that the Supreme Court was not a constitutional
court:
Lord Norton of Louth: There is a fundamental difference, then.
You are saying that the authority of the courts derives from
Parliament, and not some higher law document.
111 Constitution Committee, Evidence session with the President and Deputy President of the
Supreme Court, Evidence Session No 1, Wednesday 8 July 2015, Q7.
112 Jackson v AG [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262. `In exceptional circumstances', he said, `(for
example the abolition of judicial review)… the new Supreme Court may have to consider
whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting
at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish'. See also Axa General
Insurance v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2011] 1 AC 868. A similar point was raised in the
context of EU law in R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) (n 23).
113 Paterson (n 17) 273.
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Lady Hale: That is right.114
Although the Supreme Court has attracted criticism in some high-profile
cases,115 it has not gone out of its way to court controversy. Lord
Bingham sought to couch his judgment in Belmarsh in unexciting terms,
and Brice Dickson has observed that `In a range of other cases involving
the application of Convention rights the Bingham court was curiously
conservative, perhaps conscious that the Human Rights Act is not viewed
with universal approbation, especially by most of the tabloid press'.116 As
Eric Ip has argued, anticipation of what could happen should the court
challenge Parliament has helpedmaintain a deferential attitude towards the
legislature.117
The senior judiciary, then, has recognised the limitations of its position
under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and sought to engage in a
dialogue with Parliament. It has sought to do the same with the executive,
but Parliament has the potential to serve as a protective shield should the
executive prove unresponsive or hostile. Achieving such a relationship
with the legislature may prove difficult given executive dominance of the
House of Commons, but select committees in both Houses now provide
some protection, or at least some appreciation of the role of the courts,
not least the changing role. This appreciation of the role of judges is
not necessarily mirrored in the views of ministers, and notably not in the
coverage of court decisions by the tabloid press. However, there is an
incentive for Parliament to engage given that the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty is a judicially self-imposed one, and the obiter dictum of Lord
Steyn in Jackson identified a possible path the courts may travel in the event
of government seeking to use a parliamentary majority to ride roughshod
over fundamental constitutional principles. The presumption is that no
government would do so, and in any event would have difficulty getting
it through both Houses of Parliament.
114 Constitution Committee, Evidence session with the President and Deputy President of the
Supreme Court, Evidence Session No 1, Wednesday 8 July 2015, Q6.
115 See e.g. A v Home Secretary (n 37); Fraser v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 24, 2011 SLT 515; Bank
Mellat v HM Treasury (No 1) [2013] UKSC 38, [2014] AC 700.
116 Brice Dickson, `A Hard Act to Follow: The Bingham Court, 2000-2008', in Louis Blom-
Cooper, Brice Dickson and Gavin Drewry (n 67) 267.
117 Eric Ip, `The Institutional Foundations of SupremeCourt Power in Britain's Representative
Democracy' (2013) 49(3) Representation 281.
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The relationship of Parliament and the courts has thus changed. The
constitutional changes of recent decades have propelled the courts into
the need for a dialogue with Parliament and the executive. The dialogue
with Parliament has potential value in creating an ally to resist executive
encroachment on areas within the remit of the courts. The position of the
House of Lords has been a continuing element in appreciating the role of
the courts and in continuing to provide a means by which the courts can
speak to parliamentarians (no longer through the floor of the House, but
through committees), both formally and informally, and serve as a buffer
should the relationship between the courts and the executive take on the
characteristics of competing authority.
The relationship between Parliament and the courts has thus shifted
somewhat from the first to the third model, as acknowledged by Lord
Neuberger, from being strangers to seeking to be friends, but there remains
the threat of the second fitting the relationship of the executive and the
courts. The government may see the courts as on occasion as, if not foes,
then at least unfriendly. The Conservative Government's commitment to a
British Bill of Rights derives from a perception that the ECtHR is a threat
to decisions taken by the people's representatives and wants to shift the
burden to protect human rights to the Supreme Court. It is the perception
that shapes behaviour and, given that the Supreme Court has not usually
digressed thatmuch from the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, creates
the potential for an uneasy if not adversarial relationship. This places even
more importance on the need for Parliament and the courts to develop their
dialogue.
